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NOTE
UNPLANNED OBSOLESCENCE: INTERPRETING THE
AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE DIALING SYSTEM AFTER THE
SMARTPHONE EPOCH
Walter Allison*
Technology regulations succeed or fail based upon their ability to regulate an
idea. Constant innovation forces legislators to draft statutes aimed at prohib-
iting the idea of a device, rather than a specific device itself, because new de-
vices with new capacities emerge every day. The Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA) is a federal statute that imposes liability based on the
idea of an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS). But the statute’s defi-
nition of the device is ambiguous. The FCC struggles to coherently apply the
definition to new technologies, and courts interpret the definition inconsist-
ently. Federal circuit courts have split over these inconsistent interpretations.
This Note explains the problems associated with the TCPA’s definition and
outlines a solution that ensures uniform and workable enforcement of federal
rules.
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INTRODUCTION
A child sustains a life-threatening injury at home.1 Frantic, the child’s
mother rushes to the telephone to dial 911 and summon an ambulance.2 But
she can’t place the call.3 Her phone line is tied up by an autodialer, a com-
puterized device used by telemarketers to call potential customers.4 The au-
todialer has seized her phone line and it won’t disconnect, even if she hangs
up.5 While her child suffers, the mother realizes she is incapable of calling
for help until the autodialer’s recording has completed its message and relin-
quishes the line.6 The mother’s realization of helplessness will later be de-
scribed as “sheer terror.”7
That was thirty years ago. The child lived, but the problem persisted.8
The early 1990s were plagued with automated calls that intruded into every
facet of American life.9 Some automated calls were merely a nuisance.10 Oth-
1. See 137 CONG. REC. 35,305–06 (Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Roukema).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 35,305.
8. Id. at 35,306.
9. See Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The vol-
ume of automated telemarketing calls was not only an annoyance but also posed dangers to
public safety.”); 137 CONG. REC. 35,305–06 (Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Roukema)
(“Today, we unfortunatley [sic] find that automatic dialing recorded message players are being
used in record numbers . . . [t]his practice is an unwarranted invasion of privacy, and it can be
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ers threatened public safety. Automatic dialing systems unwittingly called
firefighters, police officers, and hospital emergency lines, seizing the phone
line and preventing actual emergency calls from getting through.11
In 1991, Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA), which defined devices that qualified as “automatic telephone dial-
ing systems” (ATDSs), regulated their use, and empowered the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the TCPA.12 But since the TCPA’s enactment, interpreting the
ATDS definition has frustrated the FCC and courts alike. Applying the defi-
nition to emerging technologies has proved especially difficult, as
smartphones and cloud-based communication apps have challenged precon-
ceived notions of the type of device that constitutes an automatic telephone
dialing system.
Definitional uncertainty can be devastating for defendants. The TCPA
created a private right of action, permitting persons or entities to recover
$500 in damages for each call placed in violation of the TCPA’s regulations
and treble damages if the court finds that the defendant willfully or know-
ingly violated the statute.13 There is no cap on damages. Theoretically, they
are infinite.14 Thus, to insulate themselves from potential liability, organiza-
tions must be certain which devices qualify as ATDSs. Unfortunately, the
FCC has not provided certainty. In a series of increasingly byzantine orders
and declaratory rulings, the Commission revised its interpretation of the
ATDS definition to account for technological innovations.15 In the process,
the FCC inadvertently raised new issues, fueling uncertainty over which
types of devices qualified as ATDSs.16 In 2015, the Commission issued an in-
terpretation encompassing devices that had the “potential ability” to perform
dangerous and life-threatening. This Congress can no longer stand by the wayside and allow
telephones to become a potential health hazard.”).
10. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 9 (1991) (discussing findings that over two-thirds of
Americans found telephone solicitations “very annoying”).
11. 137 CONG. REC. 35,305 (Nov. 26, 1991).
12. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227); see also ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
14. See Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 915–16
(7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he [TCPA], with its draconian penalties . . . imposes potentially very heavy
penalties on its violators—many of whom . . . have never heard of this obscure statute.”).
15. See, e.g., Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14,014, 14,093 para. 133 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Order] (applying
the ATDS prohibition to predictive dialers).
16. Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7976–77 para. 21 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Declaratory Ruling] (dis-
cussing whether the Commission’s interpretation of the ATDS definition applies to
smartphones).
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ATDS functions.17 Finding the interpretation to be too expansive, the D.C.
Circuit invalidated the FCC’s 2015 Declaratory Ruling as it pertained to
which devices qualified as ATDSs.18 That decision perpetuated the uncer-
tainty, eventually resulting in a split between the Third and Ninth Circuits.19
Currently, there is no consensus on the ATDS definition.
This Note advocates for a new FCC declaratory ruling that decisively in-
terprets “automatic telephone dialing system.” The FCC should interpret the
ATDS definition as: equipment which has the current ability to (1) store tel-
ephone numbers to be called, or produce telephone numbers to be called us-
ing a random or sequential number generator, and (2) dial such telephone
numbers. The Commission should interpret the definition so as to not apply
to ordinary smartphone usage. Part I explains the history of the TCPA, in-
cluding the current ATDS definition and the FCC’s history of applying and
interpreting that definition. Part II analyzes how the FCC’s incoherent inter-
pretations facilitated a circuit split over the definition’s necessary elements.
Part III argues that the FCC should resolve the circuit split by declaratory
ruling and provide meaningful guidance to affected parties by issuing a co-
herent and comprehensive interpretation of the ATDS definition.
I. THE ORIGINS OF A DILEMMA
Interpreting the ATDS definition poses a dilemma. Different canons of
interpretation yield vastly different understandings of which devices are—
and which devices are not—ATDSs, but each choice inevitably conflicts with
some aspect of the definition’s text or the statute’s regulatory scheme. These
conflicts make interpreting the definition a case study in choosing which
problems to live with. This Part provides context for understanding those
problems. Section I.A explores the TCPA’s legislative history, examining the
statutory definition of “automatic telephone dialing system” (also called an
“autodialer”) and the penalties for TCPA violations. Section I.B analyzes the
FCC’s 2003 Order, which determined that the ATDS definition encom-
passed predictive dialers. Section I.C examines the Commission’s 2015 De-
claratory Ruling, highlighting the Ruling’s incoherence and breadth.
17. Id. at 7972–76 paras. 10–19 (interpreting “capacity” to include “potential ability”);
id. at 7974 para. 15 (suggesting that an ATDS must have the capacity to generate and then dial
telephone numbers, randomly or sequentially); see also ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 693–94 (“[The
FCC] construed a device’s ‘capacity’ to encompass its ‘potential functionalities’ with modifica-
tions such as software changes.”).
18. ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 703.
19. Compare Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2018), with Marks v.
Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1052 n.8 (9th Cir. 2018).
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A. The TCPA and the ATDS Definition
In 1990, U.S. telemarketing sales exceeded China’s GDP.20 At $435 bil-
lion, this staggering sum represented a four-fold increase from 1984.21 That
increase was driven by technology: computers spearheaded 82 percent of tel-
emarketing campaigns.22 In particular, automatic dialing systems were used
en masse to “make millions of calls every day.”23
The cost of this success was America’s privacy. Every day, more than
eighteen million Americans were called by a telemarketer.24 Ill-timed auto-
mated calls proved an unwelcome, yet constant, interruption in daily life.25
Because telemarketers programmed their autodialers indiscriminately, often
using the dialing equipment to create and dial ten-digit telephone numbers
randomly or sequentially,26 calls were inadvertently placed to emergency
services including hospitals, firefighters, and police.27 Moreover, autodialers
would “seize” a recipient’s telephone line and not release the line when the
recipient hung up, but only after the telemarketer had completed their mes-
sage.28 This practice would tie up emergency service lines for extended peri-
ods.29 The never-ending intrusions prompted one senator to declare
automated calls “the scourge of modern civilization.”30
Finding that American citizens were “outraged over the proliferation of
intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes,” Congress enacted the TCPA in
1991 to regulate autodialers.31 The TCPA defines “automatic telephone dial-
20. See, e.g., Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(4),
105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (“Total United States sales generated through telemarketing amounted to
$435,000,000,000 in 1990 . . . .”); China, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/country
/china [https://perma.cc/3VJX-9RY8] (noting China’s 1990 GDP at $360.9 billion).
21. § 2(4), 105 Stat. at 2394.
22. H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 6 (1991) (“Today, computers assist an estimated 82 per-
cent of America’s businesses conducting telemarketng [sic] campaigns. And computer assis-
tance goes far beyond dialing the telephone number . . . [t]he entire sales to service marketing
function has been automated.”).
23. Id. at 10.
24. § 2(3), 105 Stat. at 2394.
25. See 137 CONG. REC. S16,205 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
26. See 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14,014, 14,092 para. 132 (2003) (“In the past, telemar-
keters may have used dialing equipment to create and dial 10-digit telephone numbers arbi-
trarily.”).
27. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. 35,305–06 (Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Roukema);
H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 10 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 101-633, at 3 (1990).
28. H.R. REP. NO. 101-633, at 3 (1990) (“The Committee record includes examples of
[autodialers] calling and seizing the telephone lines of public emergency services, dangerously
preventing those lines from being utilized to receive calls from those needing emergency ser-
vices.”).
29. Id.
30. 137 CONG. REC. S16,205 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
31. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(3), 105 Stat.
2394, 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227).
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ing system” as: “[E]quipment which has the capacity— (A) to store or pro-
duce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number
generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.”32 The TCPA prohibited autodial-
ers, making any call placed using an ATDS unlawful, with three exceptions:
calls made with the prior express consent of the called party, calls made for
emergency purposes, and calls made solely to collect a debt owed to or guar-
anteed by the United States.33 “Call,” as used within the TCPA, also applies
to text messages placed to wireless numbers.34
To enforce this prohibition, the TCPA provides a private right of action
for a person unlawfully contacted by an ATDS.35 The action authorizes $500
in damages for each violation, or up to $1,500 if the violation is knowing or
willful.36 In class actions or cases with multiple violations, damages can add
up fast, potentially resulting in astronomical liability.37 For example, in 2017,
an advertising company that ran a one-week telemarketing campaign was
found liable for $1.6 billion before getting the damages award reduced on
due process grounds in a post-trial motion.38
Such dramatic consequences should only attach to precise and predicta-
ble regulatory schemes. But the TCPA’s application has been neither precise
nor predictable because different interpretations have left organizations
without a clear understanding of which devices qualify as ATDSs under the
statutory definition. On the contrary:
The TCPA has become fertile ground for . . . lawsuits because class action
lawyers are often rewarded with quick settlements, even in cases without
any merit, simply because litigation uncertainty and the potential financial
exposure resulting from a bad decision are too great a risk for a company to
bear . . . . [T]he major driving force behind the . . . rise of TCPA lawsuits is
the legal ambiguity surrounding how the language of the TCPA itself can
be squared with today’s telephone software and equipment.39
Understanding how we got here from a seemingly innocuous definition
requires a brief review of the FCC’s efforts to interpret the ATDS definition
32. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).
33. Id. § 227(b)(1)(A). Though outside the scope of this Note, the debt-collection ex-
emption has been declared unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit. See Duguid v. Facebook,
Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2019).
34. 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14,014, 14,115 para. 165 (2003).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Paul F. Corcoran, Marc J. Rachman & David S. Greenberg, The Telephone
Consumer Protection Act: Privacy Legislation Gone Awry?, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Oct.
2014, at 9 (discussing how Bank of America faced potential liability exceeding $35 billion).
38. Golan v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 950, 956–57 (8th Cir. 2019).
39. Monica Desai, Ryan King, Maria Wolvin & Maxine Martin, A TCPA for the 21st
Century: Why TCPA Lawsuits Are on the Rise and What the FCC Should Do About It, INT’L J.
MOBILE MKTG., Summer 2013, at 65, 75–76.
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and the problems encountered when applying the definition to emerging
technologies.
B. Applying the ATDS Definition to New Technology in the FCC’s 2003
Order
By 2003, the telemarketing industry had evolved. The single largest di-
rect marketing system in the United States, telemarketers placed approxi-
mately 104 million calls every single day and generated over $600 billion in
sales per year.40 The industry’s growth was spurred by technological innova-
tion.41 In the twelve years following the TCPA’s enactment, the telemarket-
ing industry had largely transitioned to a new kind of automatic dialing
system, the predictive dialer.42 Predictive dialers improved efficiency by
eliminating the downtime between telemarketing calls.43 While a sales agent
was still on a call with a customer, the predictive dialer would start dialing
another phone number from a list of prospective customers so that, by the
time the sales agent finished their call, the dialer had already reached another
potential customer to transfer to the agent.44 This timing function, achieved
via algorithm,45 was the predictive dialer’s “principal feature.”46
Given predictive dialers’ prominent role within the telemarketing indus-
try, the FCC sought comment on whether it should regulate them as auto-
matic telephone dialing systems under the TCPA.47 Controversy ensued.
Because predictive dialers operate by dialing telephone numbers off of a list
of numbers,48 whether predictive dialers satisfy the ATDS definition depends
on the definition’s necessary elements.
If a “random or sequential number generator” is a necessary element,
such that a device must possess a number generator to satisfy the ATDS def-
40. 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14,014, 14,021–22 para. 8 (2003).
41. Id. at 14,054 para. 66 (“The number of daily calls has increased five fold (to an esti-
mated 104 million), due in part to the use of new technologies, such as predictive dialers.”).
42. Id. at 14,090 para. 129 (“[M]ore sophisticated dialing systems, such as predictive
dialers . . . are now widely used by telemarketers to increase productivity.”); Am. Teleservices
Ass’n, Comment Letter on Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, at 113 (Dec. 09, 2002), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/6513398307.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S949-D9DG] (“The evolution of the teleservices industry has progressed far
beyond the point where placing random or sequential calls would be cost-effective or profita-
ble.”).
43. Am. Teleservices Ass’n, supra note 42, at 110.
44. Id.
45. Id. (“These benefits accrue because a predictive dialer uses intelligent algorithms to
determine the number of calls it must dial . . . . The dialer bases its prediction of the number of
calls that need to be made on the number of available telephone lines, the number of sales
agents on duty, the average number of calls that do not reach a live person . . . and the average
length of each call once connected.”).
46. 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 14,091 para. 131.
47. Id. at 14,090 para. 129.
48. Am. Teleservices Ass’n, supra note 42, at 110.
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inition, then predictive dialers are not autodialers because they do not pos-
sess number generators. But if the generator is a nonessential element, such
that some devices without a number generator may still be considered auto-
dialers, then predictive dialers could qualify as ATDSs.
Generally, the comments were split between anti- and proregulation
camps. Telemarketers argued against regulation. They contended that a ran-
dom or sequential number generator is a necessary element of the ATDS
definition based on the statutory text’s plain meaning.49 Telemarketers
commented that predictive dialers were not autodialers because they rely on
telephone numbers from lists rather than generators that produce random or
sequential telephone numbers.50 Proregulation consumer groups argued that
this distinction, between devices that dialed off of lists and devices that di-
aled randomly, missed the point.51 Adopting a purposivist approach, they
contended that “for the recipient of the call, there is no difference whether
the number is dialed at random or from a database of numbers.”52
The FCC sided with consumer groups, though it is not entirely clear
how it arrived at that conclusion.53 The Commission atextually declared that
the “basic function” of an ATDS is “to dial numbers without human inter-
vention.”54 Then, the Commission interpreted the purpose of the definition’s
text—the “capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called”—as
meaning that the “prohibition on autodialed calls [should] not be circum-
vented.”55 And, with little more than that, predictive dialers were considered
autodialers.
Even if one agrees that predictive dialers should be regulated under the
TCPA, the methods by which the FCC got there are troubling. The FCC’s
explanation meanders erratically, weaving between textual, historical, and
atextual analysis without ever providing an explanation of each factor’s rele-
vance or importance.56 The Commission’s determination that predictive
dialers qualify as autodialers meant that “using a random or sequential num-
ber generator” was a nonessential element of the ATDS definition because
49. Recall that the TCPA’s definition is “equipment which has the capacity— (A) to
store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number gener-
ator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).
50. Am. Teleservices Ass’n, supra note 42, at 113; see 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 14,090
para. 130 (“Most industry members . . . argue that predictive dialers do not fall within the stat-
utory definition . . . because [they] do not [generate and then] dial numbers ‘randomly or se-
quentially.’ ”).
51. See 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 14,090 para. 130.
52. Id. at 14,091 para. 130.
53. In 2015, the Third Circuit would later refer to the FCC’s orders on this issue as
“hardly a model of clarity.” Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 629 F. App’x 369, 372 (3d Cir. 2015).
54. 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 14,092 para. 132.
55. Id. at 14,092–93 para. 133 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)).
56. See, e.g., id. at 14,092–93 paras. 132–33 (discussing the statute’s text before transi-
tioning to a discussion of Congress’s intent, then human intervention, then considering the
volume of calls autodialers place).
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predictive dialers did not use such generators; indeed, some predictive dial-
ers could not even be modified to do so.57 But the 2003 Order did not ex-
plain this departure from the statutory text or address its implications. The
failure to coherently articulate a method for applying the ATDS definition to
new technologies frustrated organizations’ ability to predict what types of
devices may qualify as ATDSs.
C. The FCC’s 2015 ATDS Interpretation Creates “Potential” Problems
The FCC’s incoherent interpretation led to a surge of TCPA lawsuits,58
and unending technological innovation demanded clarification about which
types of devices qualified as ATDSs.59 Businesses could now reach consum-
ers via smartphone app or dial phone numbers using cloud-based plat-
forms.60 Amidst a deluge of rulemaking petitions, the FCC issued a
declaratory ruling in 2015 to clarify its ATDS interpretation.61
To bring predictive dialers within the statute’s ambit, the Commission
used the word “capacity” in the ATDS definition as a textual anchor point,
determining that the best interpretation of “capacity” was as “potential abil-
ity.”62 This interpretation equated potential ability with modification and
meant that equipment that lacked the ability to generate random or sequen-
tial numbers could nevertheless be considered an ATDS if it could be modi-
fied to do so.63 Because some predictive dialers could gain the ability to
generate random or sequential numbers through software, they satisfied the
ATDS definition.64
This interpretation clarified nothing. The Commission did not specify
the degree of modification required for a device to have the “potential abil-
ity” to be an ATDS.65 Instead, it declared that “there must be more than a
theoretical potential” of modification.66 The Commission illustrated this
standard by using the rotary-dial telephone as an example of a device “too
attenuated” to be considered a potential autodialer because it was merely
57. Id. at 14,091 para. 131 n.432.
58. See generally Desai et al., supra note 39, at 75–76 (attributing the rise in lawsuits to
the TCPA’s legal ambiguity); 2015 Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7970 para. 6 (2015)
(noting that TCPA lawsuits were up 70 percent in 2013).
59. 2015 Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd. at 7970 para. 7 (“Dialing options can now be
cloud-based, and available via smartphone apps. Calling and texting consumers en masse has
never been easier or less expensive . . . . The rise in complaints, litigation, and petitions may
also be attributable to the skyrocketing growth of mobile phones . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
60. Id.
61. Id. (“[T]he Commission received 27 petitions for declaratory ruling or rulemaking
that raised TCPA questions about autodialed calls . . . .”).
62. See id. at 7975 paras. 15, 19.
63. Id. at para. 18.
64. Id. at 7974–75.
65. See id. at 7975 paras. 18–19.
66. Id.
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theoretically possible to modify a rotary phone to such extremes, not more
than theoretically possible.67 Yet it was unclear whether any nonrotary de-
vices could also pass the “theoretical potential” test. This prompted a dis-
senting Commissioner to exclaim that the interpretation was “so expansive
that the FCC has to use a rotary phone as an example of a technology that
would not be covered.”68 As in the 2003 Order, the FCC invoked atextual
factors—the necessary degree of human intervention and the volume of calls
a device can place—but did not clarify those factors’ relevance or im-
portance; in fact, the Commission specifically refused to clarify its human
intervention stance.69
Furthermore, the Declaratory Ruling itself is contradictory. Per the Rul-
ing, a random or sequential number generator is an essential definitional el-
ement because devices must have either the present or potential ability to use
a random or sequential number generator to be considered an ATDS.70 But
the Commission also reaffirmed its 2003 Order, which determined that the
generator was a nonessential element because predictive dialers without the
present or even potential ability to use generators nevertheless satisfied the
ATDS definition.71 In practice, the 2015 Declaratory Ruling meant that any
communications device that could be modified to perform autodialer func-
tions could be declared an ATDS at the FCC’s discretion. Such a broad in-
terpretation would encompass nearly all modern communication devices,
rendering almost every American citizen liable for damages under the
TCPA.
II. CIRCUITS SPLIT OVER THE ATDS DEFINITION’S NECESSARY ELEMENTS
The D.C. Circuit invalidated the Commission’s 2015 Declaratory Ruling
in ACA International v. FCC.72 The 2018 decision, however, did not an-
67. Id.
68. Id. at 8088 (Comm’r O’Rielly, dissenting) (“Equipment that could conceivably func-
tion as an autodialer in the future counts as an autodialer today . . . . That is like the FAA regu-
lating vehicles because with enough modifications cars and trucks could fly, and then using a
skateboard as an example of a vehicle that does not meet the definition.”).
69. Id. at 7973 para. 14 (majority opinion) (citing predictive dialers’ ability to dial “large
numbers” of calls as evidence that they satisfy the ATDS definition); id. at 7976 para. 20 (“We
also reject . . . [to clarify] that a dialer is not an autodialer unless it has the capacity to dial
numbers without human intervention.”); ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(“According to the Commission, then, the ‘basic function’ of an autodialer is to dial numbers
without human intervention, but a device might still qualify as an autodialer even if it cannot
dial numbers without human intervention.”).
70. 2015 Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd. at 7974 para. 15 (“[A]utodialers need only
have the ‘capacity’ to dial random and sequential numbers.”).
71. Id. at 7972 para. 10 (reaffirming its 2003 Order); 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14,014,
14093, 14,091 para. 131 n.432 (2003) (noting that some predictive dialers are not capable of
being modified for sequential or random dialing); ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 702 (“By reaffirming
[the 2003 Order], the Commission supported the notion that a device can be considered an
autodialer even if it has no capacity itself to generate random or sequential numbers . . . .”).
72. ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d 687.
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nounce a governing ATDS interpretation. The resultant confusion led to
contradictory interpretations, culminating in a split between the Third and
Ninth Circuits. Now, the TCPA is applied inconsistently across jurisdictions,
creating uncertainty for businesses concerned about class action liability.73
Section II.A discusses ACA International’s holding. Section II.B then analyz-
es ACA International’s ramifications, focusing on the Third Circuit’s
Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc. decision. Finally, Section III.C examines the other
half of the circuit split, the Ninth Circuit’s Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC
decision.
A. ACA International v. FCC: Setting Aside the FCC’s Interpretation Sets the
Stage for Circuit Split
ACA International was a response to the FCC’s 2015 Declaratory Rul-
ing.74 Entities regulated by the TCPA challenged the breadth of the ATDS
definition, hoping to secure a narrower interpretation.75 The decision fo-
cused on two aspects of the 2015 Ruling: the potential ability–capacity inter-
pretation76 and the ATDS definition’s necessary elements.77
Reviewing the capacity interpretation first, the court determined that
“[i]f a device’s ‘capacity’ includes functions that could be added through app
downloads,” then the ATDS prohibition would assume an “eye-popping
sweep.”78 As any smartphone could potentially download autodialing soft-
ware, judging a device by its potential capacity renders every smartphone an
autodialer.79 Because the statute prohibits “any call”80 placed with an ATDS,
not just automatic calls, the court noted that “any uninvited call or message
73. Amy Mattson, Unsolicited Text Messages Drive Circuit Split, A.B.A. (July 2, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/top-stories/2019/
/unsolicited-text-messages-drive-circuit-split/ [https://perma.cc/WX5U-W2Y6] (“ ‘The current
landscape makes it more difficult for plaintiffs’ and defendants’ counsel alike to understand
what is and is not an ATDS[]’. . . . ‘[B]usinesses should be very careful about engaging in tele-
marketing until after the law is well settled on the matter.’ ”); Michael O’Rielly, FCC Comm’r,
Remarks Before the ACA International Washington Insights Conference (May 16, 2019),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-357496A1.docx [https://perma.cc/4UBN-
URQZ] (“It’s a sad truth that case law has interpreted ATDS so broadly and unpredictably that
practically all modern dialing and texting technologies face the threat of legal sanction . . . .”).
74. ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 691.
75. Id. at 693–94, 696; Amended Petition for Review at 3, ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d 687 (No.
15-1211).
76. See supra Section I.C (discussing the FCC’s 2015 Declaratory Ruling and potential
capacity interpretation).
77. ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 695 (laying out the “two questions” of capacity and “func-
tions”); see also id. at 701 (explaining “functions” as “requisite features,” specifically the neces-
sity of a number generator).
78. Id. at 697.
79. Id.
80. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (“It shall be unlawful . . . to make any call . . . using any auto-
matic telephone dialing system . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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from [a smartphone] is a statutory violation” under the potential-capacity
interpretation.81 Therefore, any smartphone caller would be liable for a $500
penalty for every single text message or phone call placed without the prior
express consent of the recipient.82
The D.C. Circuit considered this outcome “untenable.”83 The court rea-
soned that finding routine smartphone communications to violate federal
law was several times removed from the TCPA’s scope.84 Determining that
the FCC’s potential-capacity interpretation lay “considerably beyond the
agency’s zone of delegated authority,”85 the D.C. Circuit held it to be unrea-
sonably expansive.86
The court then turned to whether a number generator is a necessary el-
ement of the ATDS definition.87 Reviewing the Ruling’s discussion of devices
that qualify as ATDSs, the court noted that the FCC “gives no clear answer”
as to whether a device must possess the ability to generate random or se-
quential numbers, “and in fact seems to give both answers.”88 This, on top of
the FCC’s potential-capacity interpretation, left affected parties “in a signifi-
cant fog”89 when assessing whether a device qualified as an ATDS. Ultimate-
ly, the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC’s interpretation failed to evince
reasoned decisionmaking because of its internal contradiction, then set aside
the Commission’s interpretation of which devices satisfy the ATDS defini-
tion.90
ACA International was a pyrrhic victory for regulated entities. By setting
aside the potential-capacity interpretation, the D.C. Circuit limited the
Commission’s interpretive options for “capacity,” but not so much as to give
regulated entities the narrower definition they had hoped for. Similarly, the
court noted that “[i]t might be permissible for the Commission to adopt ei-
ther interpretation” of whether a number generator is a necessary element,
so long as it does not “espouse both competing interpretations in the same
order.”91 That hardly settled the debate over the ATDS definition’s necessary
elements.
In the end, by offering no guidance on what does constitute an ATDS,
the D.C. Circuit’s holding satisfied almost no one. Businesses still cannot be
sure when they are exposing themselves to class action liability under the
81. ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 697.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 698.
84. Id. (“But a several-fold gulf between congressional findings and a statute’s suggested
reach can call into doubt the permissibility of the interpretation in consideration.”).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 700.
87. Id. at 703.
88. Id. at 702–03.
89. Id. at 703.
90. Id. at 695.
91. Id. at 703.
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TCPA.92 In hindsight, ACA International’s key takeaways are: (1) an inter-
pretation of the ATDS definition encompassing ordinary smartphone usage
is unreasonably expansive and (2) future FCC interpretations must be con-
sistent with regard to the definition’s necessary elements. Without a control-
ling FCC interpretation, litigants vied to fill the vacuum by trying their own
interpretive theories in court.
B. Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc.: Interpreting ATDS Post-ACA International
Like businesses, courts also confronted uncertainty after ACA Interna-
tional. In part, that was because courts were (and still are) confused about
whether ACA International overturned all FCC rulings interpreting the
ATDS definition or just the 2015 Ruling.93 Some courts seized the oppor-
tunity to reinterpret the ATDS definition entirely.94 Others looked back to
precedent.95
In Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., the Third Circuit looked backward. The
case centered on Bill Dominguez, who had purchased a cell phone that came
with a reassigned telephone number.96 The number’s previous owner had
subscribed to email notifications provided by Yahoo, which texted the phone
number whenever an email was sent to the previous owner’s Yahoo ac-
count.97 Dominguez received 27,809 text messages over seventeen months.98
That is approximately fifty-four unsolicited messages per day.99 Dominguez
took many reasonable steps to stop the messages. He replied with “stop” and
“help,” then contacted customer service.100 After Yahoo offered no solution,
92. See O’Rielly, supra note 73 (“Unfortunately, despite [the ACA International deci-
sion], the ‘fog of uncertainty’ . . . remains thicker than ever . . . . I’ve had countless businesses
come into my office and tell me that it’s now too risky to call their customers and provide them
with critical and time-sensitive information. These are not entities randomly soliciting
strangers . . . but providing data security breach notifications, prescription refill reminders, bill
due date notices, school closure alerts, and notices of flight schedule changes.”).
93. See, e.g., Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., No. 17-cv-01559, 2019 WL 1429346, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2019) (holding that ACA International invalidated the 2003, 2008, and 2015
FCC rulings defining ATDS), aff’d, 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020); Ammons v. Ally Fin., Inc.,
326 F. Supp. 3d 578, 587 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (holding that ACA International only invalidated
the 2015 Declaratory Ruling); see also Lucas v. DeSilva Auto. Servs., No. 1:16-cv-790, 2018 WL
2020744, at *8 n.9 (S.D. Ohio May 1, 2018) (stating that ACA International only “vacated sev-
eral aspects of” the 2015 FCC Ruling).
94. Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2018) (interpret-
ing the ATDS definition “anew”).
95. Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2018) (“In light of the D.C.
Circuit’s holding, we interpret the statutory definition of an autodialer as we did prior to the
issuance of 2015 Declaratory Ruling.”).
96. Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 629 F. App’x 369, 370 (3d Cir. 2015).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 371.
99. Id. at 370.
100. Id. at 370–71.
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he contacted the FCC.101 He eventually organized and hosted a joint call with
Yahoo’s customer service and a representative from the FCC.102 Nothing
worked.103 So, Dominguez filed a class action lawsuit against Yahoo under
the TCPA.104
The Third Circuit, relying on its previous holdings interpreting the
ATDS definition, held that the device Yahoo used to message Dominguez
did not qualify as an ATDS.105 Adopting the position that a random or se-
quential number generator is a necessary element of the ATDS definition,
the court reviewed the evidence and determined that the device was not ca-
pable of randomly or sequentially generating telephone numbers.106 Instead,
the device had merely dialed numbers off a list that had been “inputted into
its system.”107
This result was not inevitable. The Third Circuit had heard this case be-
fore in 2015 when Dominguez appealed a 2014 district court summary
judgment in favor of Yahoo, but because the FCC’s 2015 Declaratory Ruling
was published while the appeal was pending, the Third Circuit vacated the
district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for consideration
in light of the FCC’s Ruling.108 By the time the case returned in 2018, the
Third Circuit was examining the problem post-ACA International. When
previously hearing the case, the Third Circuit raised a critical interpretive
issue with the ATDS definition.109 Plainly read, the definition would require
that the device “store . . . telephone numbers to be called, using a random or
sequential number generator.”110 But number generators do not store infor-
mation.111 This befuddled the Third Circuit. The court expressed its confu-
sion in a footnote: “We acknowledge that it is unclear how a number can be
stored (as opposed to produced) using a ‘random or sequential number gen-
erator.[’] ”112 Rather than resolving the implications of this observation—
implications which may have undermined the court’s necessary-element in-
terpretation—the Third Circuit simply did not address the issue when an-
nouncing its final holding.
101. Id. at 371.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116, 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2018).
106. Id. at 121.
107. Id.
108. Dominguez, 629 F. App’x at 373; see also Dominguez, 894 F.3d at 118.
109. Dominguez, 629 F. App’x at 373 n.1.
110. See id. at 373.
111. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
112. Dominguez, 629 F. App’x at 373 n.1.
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C. Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC: Circuit Split
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC rejected
Dominguez.113 Marks involved a dispute between a gym, Crunch Fitness, and
one of its members, Jordan Marks.114 Crunch used a web-based marketing
platform that automatically sent text messages to designated recipients by
dialing off of a stored list of telephone numbers; it did not use a number
generator.115 Over the course of eleven months, Crunch sent three text mes-
sages to Marks’s cell phone.116 Marks was charged incoming tolls for each
text message.117 He filed a class action under the TCPA, lost summary judg-
ment in the district court, and then appealed.118
The Ninth Circuit interpreted ACA International to have invalidated all
prior FCC interpretations of the ATDS definition.119 Accordingly, the court
interpreted the ATDS definition “anew.”120 Beginning with the definition’s
text, the court narrowed the issue to whether a device must dial numbers
produced by a random or sequential number generator to satisfy the ATDS
definition, or if a device constitutes an ATDS by merely dialing numbers off
of a stored list.121
Marks argued that, because a number generator is not a storage device, a
device cannot use a number generator to store telephone numbers.122 There-
fore, the definition should be read as “ ‘equipment which has the capacity . . .
to [i] store [telephone numbers to be called] or [ii] produce telephone num-
bers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.’ ”123 Such
a reading would interpret “number generator” as a nonessential element of
the ATDS definition because some devices would qualify as an ATDS even
though they do not possess or use a number generator.
Crunch instead relied on a grammatical approach, arguing that because
of comma placement, “using a random or sequential number generator”
modified both “store” and “produce.”124 Ergo, “number generator” was a
113. Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1052 n.8 (9th Cir. 2018).
114. Id. at 1048.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1048–49.
119. Id. at 1049 (“Because the D.C. Circuit vacated the FCC’s interpretation of what sort
of device qualified as an ATDS, only the statutory definition of ATDS as set forth by Congress
in 1991 remains.”).
120. Id. at 1049–1050.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1050 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting from Marks’s brief).
124. Id. at 1050–51.
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necessary element of the ATDS definition.125 Because Crunch’s device lacked
such a generator, it did not qualify as an ATDS.126
The court believed that neither party’s reading offered a satisfactory in-
terpretation of the statutory language.127 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the ATDS definition was facially ambiguous because the statutory text was
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation.128 The court noted that
the D.C. Circuit in ACA International “apparently agreed” because it had
stated that either a nonessential-number-generator interpretation, or an es-
sential-number-generator interpretation, “might be permissible.”129 Turning
to other interpretive canons,130 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the ATDS
definition, within the context of the whole act131 and the TCPA’s legislative
history, encompassed devices without a number generator.132 With its hold-
ing, the Ninth Circuit issued a new ATDS interpretation: “[E]quipment
which has the capacity—(1) to store numbers to be called or (2) to produce
numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator—and
to dial such numbers.”133
The Marks court declined to follow the Third Circuit’s “unreasoned as-
sumption” that a number generator was a necessary element of the ATDS
definition.134 The court noted that the Third Circuit had encountered the
number generator interpretive problem—that a plain reading suggests an
ATDS can do the impossible and store information using a number genera-
tor—but “merely avoided” it.135 Because the Third Circuit had failed to re-
solve the issue, the Ninth Circuit declared Dominguez “unpersuasive.”136
While the battles across jurisdictions exposed the ATDS definition to some
much-needed percolation, Marks nevertheless exemplified an ugly truth: the
TCPA’s regulatory scheme was no longer nationally uniform.
125. Id. at 1051.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 1050 (“Marks and Crunch offer competing interpretations of the language of
§ 227(a)(1)(A), but both parties fail to make sense of the statutory language without reading
additional words into the statute.”); see also supra Section I.A (diagramming the ATDS defini-
tion language to illustrate the plain language’s competing interpretations).
128. Marks, 904 F.3d at 1051.
129. Id. (quoting ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 702–03 (D.C. Cir. 2018)).
130. Id.
131. See infra Section III.B.1 (discussing the TCPA’s provisos as it relates to the ATDS
definition’s use of the word “store”).
132. Marks, 904 F.3d at 1052.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 1052 n.8 (citing Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2018)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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III. THE FCC SHOULD RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT BY DECLARATORY
RULING
The FCC should issue a new ATDS interpretation by declaratory ruling
to provide certainty to consumers, businesses, and the judiciary. Section
III.A examines declaratory rulings as a mechanism for resolving the circuit
split, arguing that while the Commission is responsible for breaking the
TCPA’s regulatory scheme, it nevertheless possesses the most efficient meth-
od for fixing it. Section III.B proposes a new ATDS interpretation that solves
both the hazards inherent to the Commission’s previous interpretations and
the deficiencies identified by the D.C. Circuit in ACA International.
A. The FCC’s Ability to Resolve the Circuit Split
The FCC is most culpable for the ATDS dilemma. The Commission is
responsible for implementing the TCPA’s ATDS prohibition,137 but the FCC
abdicated this responsibility by issuing incoherent interpretations,138 which
facilitated the circuit split.139 Now, the ATDS definition is fragmenting
across jurisdictions, including those outside the circuit split. District courts
are scrambling to apply the statutory text and case law, generating compet-
ing interpretations with each new holding.140
The competing interpretations mean that even a theoretically perfect ju-
dicial ATDS interpretation is an insufficient mechanism for achieving uni-
formity unless issued by the Supreme Court. Any interpretation is
meaningless if it is not applied by all courts. The courts’ divergent approach-
es all but ensure that a non-Supreme Court interpretation would just get lost
in the echo chamber—ignored in deference to that jurisdiction’s precedent.
Thus, a lasting solution must not only provide a coherent ATDS interpreta-
tion but also rein in courts by binding every circuit.
The FCC can provide such a solution. Under Brand X, a court’s prior in-
terpretation of a statute supersedes a subsequent agency interpretation oth-
erwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the court’s prior decision held
the statute to be unambiguous and leave no room for agency discretion.141
Neither Dominguez nor Marks determined the TCPA’s ATDS definition to
137. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (“The Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement
the requirements of this subsection.”).
138. E.g., 2015 Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961 (2015) (issuing contradictory
ATDS interpretations); see supra Sections I.B, I.C.
139. See supra Part II.
140. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing district courts’ inconsistent
interpretations of ACA International’s holding and varying approaches toward applying the
TCPA’s ATDS prohibition).
141. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–84
(2005).
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be unambiguous.142 Thus, if the Commission issues a valid declaratory ruling
reinterpreting the ATDS definition, that ruling would bind the Third and
Ninth Circuits.
Applying the Brand X doctrine via declaratory ruling is the best mecha-
nism available for resolving the circuit split. First, it is efficient. A declaratory
ruling eliminates repetitious claims across circuits, thereby preserving judi-
cial resources.143 Second, a declaratory ruling ensures that “enforcement of
federal rules is uniform and workable,”144 rather than erratic and based on
jurisdiction. And third, it allows the FCC to execute its congressionally
mandated duty to the American people.145
B. A Twenty-First Century Interpretation of Automatic Telephone Dialing
System
The FCC should interpret the ATDS definition as: equipment which has
the current ability to (1) store telephone numbers to be called, or produce
telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number gener-
ator, and (2) dial such telephone numbers. The Commission should inter-
pret the definition so as to not apply to ordinary smartphone usage. This
position endorses the Ninth Circuit’s Marks interpretation of “store,” while
recognizing that the Marks interpretation creates a smartphone-
encompassing problem that is best resolved through declaratory ruling. Op-
erating through declaratory ruling also allows the FCC to simultaneously re-
interpret “capacity.”
This interpretation is the best reading of the statute. It provides certainty
to interested parties by answering the storage and capacity interpretive ques-
tions.146 Furthermore, eliminating both the potential-capacity proposition
and the TCPA’s applicability to ordinary smartphone usage means that this
interpretation is valid under ACA International.
142. Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1051 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that
the ATDS definition is facially ambiguous); Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116 (3d Cir.
2018) (issuing a holding without addressing the TCPA’s ambiguity).
143. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Su-
preme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
1109–10 (1987) (discussing the unique strains circuit splits place on administrative agencies
and “a bureaucratic structure Congress created specifically to encourage national uniformity in
law administration”).
144. Cf. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD L. HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 259
(5th ed. 2019) (referencing a similar virtue of universal injunctions).
145. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (“The Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement
the requirements of this subsection.”).
146. See supra Section I.A (outlining the interpretive difficulties inherent to the ATDS
definition’s plain text).
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1. To Store . . .
Ultimately, circuits split over the necessary elements of the ATDS defini-
tion.147 Whether a device must be able to randomly or sequentially generate
telephone numbers to satisfy the ATDS definition, or if it is sufficient that
the device can merely store telephone numbers and dial them, is crucial to
the TCPA’s regulatory scheme. Technological innovations within the tele-
services industry have made it more efficient to contact individuals by stor-
ing lists of telephone numbers than by randomly or sequentially generating
those numbers.148 The industry standard is to upload a database of phone
numbers to a device and then program that device to automatically dial
those numbers at predetermined times.149 These devices do not use number
generators.150 If a random or sequential number generator is interpreted as a
necessary element, then the TCPA’s ATDS prohibition will not apply to the
majority of automated phone calls and text messages.
The ATDS statutory definition is facially ambiguous because it is capa-
ble of more than one reasonable interpretation.151 Courts and interested
stakeholders disagree about whether the number generator is an essential el-
ement of the ATDS definition.
Interpreting the number generator as a nonessential element is the bet-
ter reading. A literal reading produces the irrational result that an ATDS
must be able to store numbers to be called using a random or sequential
number generator.152 Yet an ordinary number generator does not store in-
formation.153 For “store” to have operative effect within the regulatory
147. See supra Section II.C (discussing the Marks decision).
148. See Am. Teleservices Ass’n, supra note 42, at 113 (“The evolution of the teleservices
industry has progressed far beyond the point where placing random or sequential calls would
be cost-effective or profitable.”).
149. See 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14,014, 14,090 para. 130 (2003) (“Most industry mem-
bers . . . [use] predictive dialers [to] store pre-programmed numbers or receive numbers from a
computer database and then dial those numbers . . . .”); Am. Teleservices Ass’n, supra note 42,
at 113–14 (discussing how predictive dialers function by having an operator “obtain and pro-
gram a list of numbers to call”).
150. A popular defense to § 227 claims is to argue that a device is not an ATDS because it
cannot generate random or sequential numbers. See, e.g., Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC,
904 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018); Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir.
2018); Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., No. 17-cv-01559, 2019 WL 1429346, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
29, 2019), aff’d, 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020).
151. Marks, 904 F.3d at 1051 (“[T]he statutory text is ambiguous on its face.”); see also
ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 702–03 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (discussing the FCC’s multiple inter-
pretations of the ATDS definition and noting that “[i]t might be permissible for the Commis-
sion to adopt either interpretation”).
152. Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 629 F. App’x 369, 372 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We
acknowledge that it is unclear how a number can be stored (as opposed to produced) using a
‘random or sequential number generator.[’] ”).
153. See 2015 Declaratory Ruling, 18 FCC Rcd. 7961, 8074 n.563 (2015) (Pai, Comm’r,
dissenting) (“A random number [generator] generates numbers randomly . . . . A sequential
number generator generates numbers in sequence . . . .”); Random Number Generator (RNG),
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scheme, the device itself must possess the storage capacity necessary for tele-
phone numbers. Because storage is not derived from a number generator,
but is nevertheless a capacity contemplated by the ATDS definition, “to
store” is most logically read as a standalone ability. This disjunctive reading
is consistent with the text: a device can be considered an ATDS if it has the
ability to store or produce telephone numbers.154 Under this approach, the
number generator is relevant because it explains how an ATDS might pro-
duce telephone numbers, but it has no bearing on devices that merely store
telephone numbers and then dial such numbers. Admittedly, this is an im-
perfect reading of the text. But it is a reading that prevents surplusage and
pays due respect to the definition’s operative elements.
The TCPA’s provisos further support interpreting “number generator”
as nonessential and preserving storage as a standalone ability.155 The statute
allows calls to be placed with an ATDS provided that the calling party has
the prior express consent of the called party.156 To call a consenting party, an
ATDS would have to dial from a predetermined, preexisting list of telephone
numbers belonging to consenters. The fact that this exception exists proves
that a device merely dialing from a stored list of individuals without using a
number generator is considered an ATDS under the statute. That is why calls
placed to consenting individuals are specifically exempted from the statute’s
purview.157
The consent exception demonstrates how reading the statute as “to
store . . . telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential num-
ber generator” renders the generator superfluous.158 Because the generator is
not used for storage, and the numbers being called are not being generated,
the number generator is insignificant.159 A better reading avoids surplusage
by interpreting the existence or use of a generator as an element separate
from storage and attached to the device’s “to produce” functionality.
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/random_number
_generator [https://perma.cc/WMG8-APAP] (listing four different definitions for the term
“random number generator,” none of which reference storage capacity).
154. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).
155. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (holding
that a provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the
statutory scheme, because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect
compatible with the rest of the law); see also Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Un-
predictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First
Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71, 101 (2018) (observing that the whole act canon is widely used).
156. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (“It shall be unlawful . . . to make any call (other than a call . . .
made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing
system . . . .” (emphasis added)).
157. Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2018).
158. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A).
159. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“A statute should be construed so that
effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant . . . .” (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:06, at 181–86 (6th ed. 2000 rev.))).
October 2020] Unplanned Obsolescence 167
In 2015, Congress amended the TCPA to add another exception that
further demonstrates that a device merely dialing stored telephone numbers
without using a number generator satisfies the ATDS definition.160 This ex-
ception exempted the ATDS prohibition for calls “made solely to collect a
debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”161 For this exemption to
have effect, a device calling from a predetermined, stored list of debtors for
debt collection purposes must be considered an ATDS.
The fact that Congress amended the statute in 2015 is also relevant. By
2015, the FCC had been interpreting the ATDS definition to encompass de-
vices that dialed stored telephone numbers, without possessing a number
generator, for twelve years.162 Congress’s decision to amend the statute yet
retain the same definition in light of the FCC’s interpretation indicates that
Congress concurred with the FCC’s conclusion that a number generator is a
nonessential element.163
Counterarguments to the proposition that a number generator is a non-
essential element often begin with grammatical gymnastics and end with un-
satisfying results.164 In petitioning the Supreme Court to review the Marks
decision,165 the defendant argued that the “rules of grammar and punctua-
tion” support the “commonsense” conclusion that the definition’s proper
interpretation is that telephone numbers are stored using a random or se-
quential number generator.166 The defendant argued that the statute’s con-
ceived number generator is capable of storing information because
“[n]umber generation and storage are not mutually exclusive.”167
Reading storage capacity into “random or sequential number generator”
creates more interpretive problems than it solves. First, as noted above, stor-
age is not inherent to the ordinary meaning of “random or sequential num-
ber generator.” Second, it begs the question: Why did Congress use the term
“random or sequential number generator” if it was referencing more capaci-
160. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 301, 129 Stat. 584, 588.
161. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).
162. See supra Section I.B (discussing the 2003 FCC order which ruled that predictive
dialers qualified as an ATDS).
163. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware
of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation
when it re-enacts a statute without change.”); see also Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904
F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Because we infer that Congress was aware of the existing def-
inition of ATDS, its decision not to amend the statutory definition of ATDS to overrule the
FCC’s interpretation suggests Congress gave the interpretation its tacit approval.”).
164. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17, 23–24, Crunch San Diego, LLC v. Marks, 139
S. Ct. 1289 (2019) (mem.) (No. 18-995), 2019 WL 411371 (referencing the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Marks as “linguistic gymnastics”).
165. The case settled and the petition for certiorari was withdrawn. Justin O. Kay, De-
fendant in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC Abandons Appeal, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 5, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/defendant-marks-v-crunch-san-diego-llc-abandons-
appeal [https://perma.cc/G22N-NAK7].
166. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 164, at 15–19.
167. Id. at 17.
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ties than just random or sequential number generation?168 The use of this
narrow term, as opposed to a broader term like “computer,” suggests that
“number generator” should be interpreted narrowly.
But endowing generators with storage capacity expands the term to the
point of encompassing so many abilities that the statute now refers to a
computer instead of a generator. If the statute’s contemplated random or se-
quential number generators are capable of storing telephone numbers, then
they must also possess other capacities to make using the stored numbers
practicable. For example, the generator would need to be capable of sorting
stored telephone numbers. After all, an ATDS must dial the numbers in
some designated order. Furthermore, a storage-capable generator implicates
both hardware and software capacities associated with data storage, such as
addressability, volatility, and data-transfer instructions.169
Stitching together this many capacities creates a Frankenstein device,
with specialized components completely unrelated to number generation,
and this leads to a line-drawing problem: At what point would this device
exceed the bounds of what any reasonable person would call a number gen-
erator?170 Since storage is a capacity ordinarily associated with computers,
and ordinarily not associated with number generators, a storage-capable
generator seems more aptly labeled some form of computer.171 Here, a stor-
age-capable argument collapses in on itself. Once the hypothetical number
168. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A).
169. See DAVID A. PATTERSON & JOHN L. HENNESSY, COMPUTER ORGANIZATION AND
DESIGN: THE HARDWARE/SOFTWARE INTERFACE: RISC-V EDITION 15–25, 68 (2018). Address
is a value used to delineate the location of a specific data element within a memory array. Id. at
68. Volatility references volatile memory, which is storage that retains data only if it is receiv-
ing power, and nonvolatile memory that can retain data without a power source like hard
drives. Id. at 22–23. Data transfer instructions refer to commands that move data between
memory arrays and registers. Id. at 68; see also id. at 19–20 (defining “memory” as “[t]he stor-
age area in which programs are kept when they are running and that contains the data needed
by the running programs” and explaining the necessary hardware components for DRAM).
170. Congress was likely referencing the ordinary meaning of “random or sequential
number generator.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A). If Congress had meant a unique device, then it
would have almost certainly included it in § 227’s list of definitions. See id. § 227(a) (defining
five different definitions for the purposes of interpreting § 227 without a unique definition for
“random or sequential number generator”).
171. See, e.g., Computer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/computer [https://perma.cc/43R8-AGDK] (“[A] programmable usual-
ly electronic device that can store, retrieve, and process data[.]” (emphasis added)); Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (“[T]he term ‘computer’ means an elec-
tronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device perform-
ing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or
communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but
such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calcu-
lator, or other similar device . . . .”); cf. 2015 Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 8074 n.563
(2015) (Comm’r Pai, dissenting) (“A random number generates numbers randomly . . . . A se-
quential number generator generates numbers in sequence . . . .”); Random Number Generator
(RNG), supra note 153; ZOOLANDER (Paramount Pictures 2001) (“They’re in the computer.”
(emphasis added)).
October 2020] Unplanned Obsolescence 169
generator is endowed with storage ability, it becomes something more than a
number generator. And that device, whatever it is, departs from the statute’s
text.
Some courts have interpreted the term “using a random or sequential
number generator” to modify neither “store” nor “produce,” but instead the
object: the “telephone numbers to be called.”172 This interpretation focuses
on the origin of the telephone numbers, holding that “using a random or se-
quential number generator” alludes to a required characteristic of the num-
bers to be dialed.173 But this approach renders autodialers impracticable for
uses expressly contemplated by the statute, namely, contacting consenters
and debtors. Many companies want to call only stored numbers off of a pre-
determined list. If limited to using randomly or sequentially generated num-
bers, they will invariably generate numbers that they do not wish to call or
even numbers they are barred from calling under the statute.174 Notably, this
reading renders the TCPA’s consent proviso superfluous. A company seek-
ing to contact a specific consenting party would have to begin by generating
numbers, hoping to fortuitously generate that party’s exact number. That re-
sult is absurd.175 Functionally, it turns autodialers into an impracticable
mechanism for calling consenting parties, rendering the TCPA’s consent ex-
emption mere surplusage.
This result contravenes the statutory scheme. The statute does not ban
autodialers but rather regulates the types of calls that may or may not be
made. Because certain types of calls are explicitly authorized, the statute
should not be interpreted to render autodialers impracticable for those ex-
plicitly authorized uses.
2. Excluding Ordinary Smartphone Use
The most persuasive counterargument to this Note’s proposed storage
interpretation is that it would fail the ACA International guidelines because
it encompasses smartphones. Consider the basic calling function most
smartphones use. Rather than dialing the number manually, a person instead
selects a name and the phone dials the numbers automatically. Group text
messaging has made it possible for even an ordinary smartphone user to
contact dozens of people at once without having to manually dial a single
172. Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., No. 17-cv-01559, 2019 WL 1429346, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 29, 2019) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)), aff’d, 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020).
173. Id.
174. 47 U.S.C.§ 227(b)(1)(A)(i) (forbidding ATDS calls to emergency telephone lines,
hospitals, and law enforcement agencies).
175. Similarly, forcing the telephone numbers themselves to be randomly or sequentially
generated would also make autodialers impracticable to contact debtors, or to make calls for
emergency purposes, since most emergencies (hurricanes, floods, tornados, fires, etc.) are lim-
ited to a specific geographic location. Id. § 227 (b)(1)(A) (creating an exception to the ATDS
prohibition for calls made for emergency purposes).
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number. For this reason, the FCC’s interpretation of ATDS should expressly
exclude ordinary smartphone usage.
Although a smartphone is a device that stores numbers to be called and
then dials such numbers, the Commission has the power to issue rules or or-
ders that exempt calls made to cellular phones from the ATDS prohibi-
tion.176 Additionally, the FCC could acknowledge that applying the TCPA to
smartphones would exceed the scope of its delegated authority. In the D.C.
Circuit’s words, the FCC can “fashion exemptions . . . preventing a result
under which every uninvited call or message from a standard smartphone
would violate the statute.”177
A smartphone exemption coheres with the TCPA’s regulatory frame-
work. This can be demonstrated by applying Professor Samuel Bray’s inter-
pretation of the mischief rule to the ATDS prohibition by contrasting the
antecedent problem that the prohibition addresses with smartphones’ ordi-
nary use.178 The antecedent problem is businesses using esoteric autodialing
devices to place high volumes of unsolicited calls.179 A single solicitor fre-
quently contacted more than sixty people per day prior to the TCPA’s en-
actment.180 By contrast, ordinary smartphones are not esoteric; they are
ubiquitous. The problems presented by Dominguez181 are not implicated by
regular smartphone users. Reasonable people do not send 27,809 unsolicited
messages to a protesting adult. Since ordinary smartphone usage is suffi-
ciently distinct from the antecedent problem contemplated by the ATDS
prohibition, it would impermissibly expand the statute’s scope to apply the
TCPA to smartphones.182
Essentially, this is what a smartphone exemption should look like: The
FCC would be responsible for establishing the exemption’s details and scope.
In doing so, the Commission would rely on its own technical expertise and
telemarking industry data to provide a basis for comparison. Should the case
ever arise where a smartphone user is sued under the TCPA’s ATDS prohibi-
tion, courts would then have a frame of reference to determine whether the
smartphone user has sufficiently deviated from ordinary use and instead
used the device as an ATDS.
176. Id. § 227(b)(2)(C) (“The Commission . . . may, by rule or order, exempt from the
requirements of paragraph (1)(A)(iii) of this subsection calls to a telephone number assigned
to a cellular telephone service that are not charged to the called party, subject to such condi-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary in the interest of the privacy rights this
section is intended to protect . . . .”).
177. ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
178. See Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief Rule, 109 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manu-
script at 28) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
179. See supra Section I.A.
180. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243 § 2(3), 105
Stat. 2394, 2394.
181. See supra Section II.B.
182. ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 699.
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This move may look suspiciously like a purposivist argument, but pur-
posivism is focused on interpreting a statute to achieve an end state.183 Ra-
ther, this Note’s approach is merely a recognition that words are imprecise
and that the check on imprecision is context.184 Contextualizing statutory
language requires understanding the problem, or mischief, that prompted
that language’s enactment.185 This context helps to rationalize a stopping
point when assessing a statute’s scope.186 Here, the breadth required by any
ATDS definition runs the risk of inadvertently enveloping unassuming users
beyond the statute’s purview. Determining where the TCPA’s necessarily
broad language stops can be achieved by acknowledging that the ATDS pro-
hibition was aimed at devices that were commercial and highly specialized
and placed a large volume of unsolicited calls to a large volume of noncon-
senting strangers.187 Ordinary smartphones are personal and multifunction-
al, and they typically contact fewer strangers. Interpreting the statute not to
include smartphones satisfies the statute’s terms and stops at the obvious
mischief, whereas interpreting it to include smartphones threatens innocent
parties and agency overreach.188
In practice, the FCC may be reluctant to implement a smartphone ex-
emption for fear of being overturned under Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA (UARG).189 In UARG, the EPA was interpreting the Clean Air Act
(CAA), which requires entities with the potential to emit more than 100 tons
of a relevant pollutant per year to apply for permits.190 Because the EPA in-
terpreted “relevant pollutant” to encompass greenhouse gasses, and because
practically every building emits more than 100 tons of greenhouse gasses per
year, the EPA published a Tailoring Rule that articulated a new threshold of
100,000 tons per year to avoid impermissibly expanding the CAA’s scope.191
The Supreme Court struck down the greenhouse gas exemption, holding
183. See Bray, supra note 178, at 33 (“One way to conceptualize the distinction between
the mischief and legislative purpose . . . is that the mischief will tend to be a negative state of
affairs antecedent to the law, whereas the purpose is more likely to be an affirmative principle
or aim going forward.”).
184. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity
of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”).
185. Bray, supra note 178, at 24 (“[T]ext-in-light-of-mischief is often more predictable to
the reasonable observer than the bare text read for all it is worth.”).
186. Id. at 36.
187. See supra Part I.
188. See Prescott v. Nevers, 19 F. Cas. 1286, 1288–89 (C.C.D. Me. 1827) (“If [a statute] is
susceptible of two interpretations, one of which satisfies the terms, and stops at the obvious
mischief provided against, and the other goes to an extent, which may involve innocent parties
in its penalties, it is the duty of the court to adopt the former.”).
189. 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
190. Util. Air Regul. Grp., 503 U.S. at 322–25.
191. Id.
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that “[a]n agency has no power to ‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic policy
goals by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms.”192
But a TCPA smartphone exemption is distinguishable from the exemp-
tion at issue in UARG because the ATDS definition is anything but an “un-
ambiguous statutory term[].”193 The CAA involved specific numerical
thresholds, but in the TCPA, Congress elected not to use such specific pre-
scriptions when crafting the ATDS definition. Congress certainly had
enough data at its disposal that it could have included some form of numeri-
cal threshold, such as a prescribed call volume a device must be capable of
achieving within eight hours before qualifying as an ATDS. Instead, Con-
gress used broader language and entrusted its interpretation to the FCC.194
By doing so, Congress implicitly authorized the FCC to interpret the ATDS
definition to exclude specific devices.
This interpretation is permissible.195 In UARG, the Court approvingly
noted that while the Act-wide definition of air pollutant is very broad,
“where the term ‘air pollutant’ appears in the Act’s operative provisions, . . .
EPA has routinely given it a narrower, context-appropriate meaning.”196 The
Court endorsed the EPA’s contextual interpretations, highlighting that the
EPA had spent decades interpreting air pollutants as limited to “regulated air
pollutants” in specific sections of the CAA, despite the fact that such a limi-
tation was not within the term’s statutory definition.197 Here, while the
ATDS definition may generically encompass smartphones, the FCC could
interpret the definition more narrowly within the statute’s ATDS prohibi-
tion. This device-specific exemption was specifically envisioned by Con-
gress.198 In its Congressional Statement of Findings, Congress noted that
“the Federal Communications Commission should have the flexibility to de-
sign different rules for those types of automated or prerecorded calls that it
finds are not considered a nuisance or invasion of privacy, or for noncom-
mercial calls.”199
In sum, endowing number generators with storage capacity contravenes
“number generator’s” plain meaning by conceiving of a number generator as
a computer. Requiring the numbers themselves to have been randomly or
sequentially generated renders autodialers unsuited for uses contemplated by
192. Id. at 325.
193. Id.
194. See supra Part I.
195. Env’t Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (“A given term in the
same statute may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects
calling for different implementation strategies. The point is the same even when the terms
share a common statutory definition . . . .”).
196. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 316.
197. Id. at 316–17.
198. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–243, § 2(13), 105 Stat.
2394.
199. Id.
October 2020] Unplanned Obsolescence 173
the statute. For “store” and its associated provisos to simultaneously operate
within the statute without rendering store or the number generator super-
fluous, it is essential to interpret the number generator as nonessential.
3. Capacity
Interpreting “capacity” has proved troublesome.200 The D.C. Circuit in-
validated the FCC’s notorious “potential capacity interpretation” because it
was unreasonably expansive, setting in motion the chain of events that cul-
minated with the circuit split.201 Any declaratory ruling seeking to reinter-
pret the ATDS definition should also provide a consistent interpretation of
“capacity” to address the grievances raised in ACA International.202 Other-
wise, the ruling runs the risk of judicial invalidation.
The statute’s plain language supports interpreting “capacity” as synon-
ymous with “current ability.”203 When determining statutory definitions,
nontechnical words are given their ordinary meaning.204 Ordinarily, defining
an object by its capacity references its present capacity. For example, when
Dodge advertises a truck’s towing capacity at 9,000 pounds, it is not advertis-
ing the truck’s ability to tow 9,000 pounds in the far-flung future after modi-
fications. It is advertising its current ability to tow 9,000 pounds.205 The same
is true here. When the TCPA contemplates “equipment which has the capac-
ity,” it is contemplating equipment with the current ability to perform the
specified functions.
This interpretation is supported by the grammatical context within
which “capacity” is used.206 Here, the sentence containing “capacity” is writ-
ten in the present tense, suggesting the statute is not contemplating a de-
vice’s future or potential capacity.207 If Congress had intended the statute to
encompass a device’s potential, it could have done so by selecting language
to that effect: for example, “equipment which could have the capacity” as op-
posed to “has the capacity.”208
200. See supra Section I.B (discussing the definition of “capacity” and previous FCC in-
terpretations).
201. See supra Part II.
202. See supra Section III.A
203. See Notice of Ex Parte of Wells Fargo & Company at 1, 10, CG Docket No. 02-278
(June 5, 2015) [hereinafter Notice of Ex Parte], https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001077006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N8TU-MQZ5].
204. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991); Nix v. Hedden, 149
U.S. 304 (1893).
205. Cf. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242–45 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (“[It is a] fundamental principle
of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be
determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it used.”).
207. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) (“The term ‘automatic telephone dialing system’ means
equipment which has the capacity . . . .” (emphasis added)).
208. Notice of Ex Parte, supra note 203, at 10.
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The broader context of the TCPA’s regulatory scheme supports inter-
preting capacity to mean “current ability.” If “capacity” means “current abil-
ity,” to qualify as an ATDS, the equipment must be presently able to make a
call by dialing phone numbers.209 The text bolsters this interpretation: the
word “has” is a present-tense form of “to have,” which means “possess.”210
Therefore, the equipment must possess the current ability to dial phone
numbers to qualify as an ATDS. Put another way, triggering the prohibition
requires the equipment to be functioning as an autodialer when the call is
made. By comparison, if “capacity” is interpreted as “potential ability,” then
using an ATDS means using equipment that has the potential ability to dial
phone numbers. This offers no guidance to interested parties because pre-
dicting an object’s potential requires, in some sense, predicting the future.
Furthermore, it means the statute is regulating every single call made by eve-
ry single device that could “potentially” be an ATDS. This yields an absurdly
overbroad result. The fact that Congress defined autodialers at all cautions
against this interpretation, which would prohibit nonautomatic calls placed
from devices incapable of satisfying the ATDS definition at the time the call
was made. This interpretation would move significantly past the mischief the
ATDS prohibition is meant to address.211 Such a move is unnecessary to
achieve the statute’s regulatory effects and results in an impermissible scope
encompassing ordinary devices that would not survive judicial review.212
CONCLUSION
The FCC is facing a dilemma of its own creation and it must act. To do
nothing is to endorse the inconsistent enforcement of federal rules across ju-
risdictions. This Note calls on the FCC to do its job. A valid declaratory rul-
ing is the simplest and fastest mechanism for resolving the circuit split and
achieving a nationally uniform application of the ATDS prohibition. Sub-
stantively, interpreting storage as a stand-alone capacity is the best reading
of the TCPA and can be implemented without affecting ordinary
smartphone use. Finally, a coherent, internally consistent interpretation of-
fers certainty to interested parties by settling the “capacity” and necessary
elements interpretive issues.
209. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).
210. Has, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/has [https://perma.cc/5H4A-Q9KD] (defining as “present tense third-person sin-
gular of HAVE”); Have, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/have [https://perma.cc/5XQ5-E8U3] (defining as “to hold or maintain
as a possession” or “to possess as a characteristic”; listing “possess” as a synonym).
211. See supra Sections I.A, III.B.2.
212. See, e.g., ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
